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Abstract 11 
Food-borne infections cause a considerable amount of illnesses, heavily affecting healthcare 12 
systems. Given the spread of food-borne infections, assessing food risks is a relevant issue for the 13 
food industry and policymakers. Following a systematic and meta-analytical approach, we evaluate 14 
how different sources and types of risks (i.e. objective and subjective) are valued by consumers, in 15 
order to emphasise to what extent information on food risks may be efficiently transferred to 16 
consumers. The results show that information on food safety, conveyed through labels, exerts a 17 
positive influence on the premium prices for food safety. Consumers would be willing to pay a 18 
price premium up to 168.7% for food products that are treated against a specific food-borne risk 19 
factor, certified to be safe, tested or even inspected by public or third parties. However, we also find 20 
that labels are inefficient instruments of information on food safety, particularly when products are 21 
likely to be affected by hazardous and risky events and consumers correctly perceive risks. The 22 
results suggest that consumers exposed to relevant risk information about food safety tend to 23 
increase their risk perception and to decrease their premium prices for information on food safety. 24 
Including labels on food safety may fill the information gap and thus lower the mismatch between 25 
(objective) scientific-based risks and (subjective) perceived risks. 26 
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1. Introduction 35 
Food-borne infections are a major cause of illness and death worldwide (Ifft et al., 2012; De Groote 36 
et al., 2016), as stated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in its Global Strategy for Food 37 
Safety1. In developing countries food-borne infections lead to the death of many children (Kosek et 38 
al., 2003), and affect children’s growth and their cognitive development (Black et al., 1984; 39 
Guerrant et al., 1999). Also, in developed countries a considerable amount of illnesses is caused by 40 
food-borne infections, thus heavily affecting healthcare systems (Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019). 41 
Animal-based foods are widespread all over the world and often considered the key cause of the 42 
increase in food-borne infections. We provide some emblematic examples. Eggs are used as an 43 
ingredient in a wide range of foods, but the complexity of such foods associated with the large 44 
number of ingredients, make it difficult to ascribe the resultant diseases to a particular ingredient 45 
(Hessel et al., 2019). However, about 70% of complex foods associated with illness are egg-based 46 
or include eggs as an ingredient (Addak et al., 2005). The complex foods which contain eggs are 47 
considered a major source of infection for food related diseases. Addak et al. (2005) find that eating 48 
shellfish (a luxury food with relatively low consumption levels) is associated with a very high 49 
disease risk. Although the number of cases attributed to shellfish are in the same ranges or levels as 50 
beef or eggs, the level of risk is much higher (Gillespie et al., 2001). Pre-harvesting contamination 51 
of oysters with norovirus has a major impact on generating cases of disease (Addak et al., 2005). 52 
Red meat (e.g. beef, lamb, pork) contributes heavily to deaths, despite lower levels of risk (e.g. 53 
Rodrigues et al., 2001; Neimann et al., 2003). However high risks, in terms of severity of illness, 54 
are also associated with eating chicken (Torija et al., 2003) which has a lower disease risk ratio than 55 
shellfish or turkey, but a higher hospitalisation risk ratio. A further issue for animal-based food is 56 
 
1 The Strategy consists of seven approaches developed to reduce the health and social burden of food-borne disease: (i) 
strengthening surveillance systems of food-borne diseases; (ii) improving risk assessments; (iii) developing methods for 
assessing the safety of the products of new technologies; (iv) enhancing the scientific and public health role of WHO in 
Codex; (v) enhancing risk communication and advocacy; (vi) improving international and national cooperation; (vii) 
strengthening capacity building in developing countries. The goal of reducing the health and social burden of food-
borne disease will be achieved through three principal lines of action: (1) advocating and supporting the development of 
risk-based, sustainable, integrated food safety systems; (2) devising science-based measures along the entire food 
production chain that will prevent exposure to unacceptable levels of microbiological agents and chemicals in food; (3) 
assessing and managing food-borne risks and communicating information, in cooperation with other sectors and 
partners (World Health Organisation, 2002). 
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the possibility of developing antimicrobial resistance. Fighting against antimicrobial resistance is a 57 
priority for many countries (O’Brien, 2014). In 2011 the European Commission launched a 5‐year 58 
Action Plan against the rising threats from antimicrobial resistance, with a set of rigorous measures 59 
to fight against the use of antimicrobials, particularly in the dairy sector. 60 
Assessing food risks is a relevant issue for the food industry and for policymakers (Ververis et al., 61 
2020). The risks in the food sector are several, of various nature and, potentially, responsible for 62 
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are mainly due to the adoption of ad hoc protocols and 63 
standards, aimed at limiting contamination and propagation of pathogens (e.g. product recalls, 64 
Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019; disposal of food and feed, De Groote et al., 2016). Indirect costs are 65 
associated with the potential reduction of sales, due to food scares, or sales restrictions imposed by 66 
penalties (e.g. reduced consumption of certain categories or brands until the situation returns 67 
normal, Grunert, 2005). While the scientific progresses contribute to the limitation of direct costs, 68 
understanding the perception of risks is a more demanding challenge, particularly because of the 69 
number of factors involved in consumer choices. The numerosity and complexity of food risks 70 
make it challenging consumers’ choices, and the design of policy interventions and marketing 71 
campaigns. 72 
Apart from the main drivers of consumers behaviour (e.g. price, income, tastes), an important role is 73 
played by the individual attitudes (e.g. neophobia, neophilie) (Grunert, 2005). For new products, the 74 
attitudes toward potential risks associated with consumption (i.e. risk aversion) is also important. 75 
The decisions under uncertainty are taken after having considered several factors (e.g. risk attitude 76 
and risk perceptions) and having processed the information provided to consumers (Cao et al., 77 
2015). In this framework, departures from rationality and non-coherent choices with respect to risky 78 
decisions may help explaining consumers’ choices. An example of low-rational (or non-rational) 79 
attitude is the attitude towards ambiguity. The ambiguity aversion, that is the aversion of economic 80 
agents (i.e. consumers) when facing risky situations in which the probabilities associated with risks 81 
are unclear, affects consumers behaviour (see Ellsberg, 1961). The attitude toward ambiguity is due 82 
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to incomplete information, and to differences in capability of processing information (Fox and 83 
Tversky, 1995), in the channels through which information are conveyed and in the cognitive 84 
process guiding consumers in processing information. 85 
The current literature has not yet deepened on some of these issues. A recent systematic review by 86 
Frewer et al. (2016) emphasises how food risk communication interventions influence risk attitudes 87 
and behaviours. The authors show that research interest has been relatively recent and conclude on 88 
three relevant themes for developing best practices in risk communication: the characteristics of the 89 
target population; the information contents; the features of the information sources. The study also 90 
concludes that the literature falls short in quantifying the gap between objective risks and subjective 91 
risks and how the communication may reduce the mismatch. 92 
We use a systematic and meta-analytical approach to evaluate how different sources and types of 93 
risks (i.e. objective and subjective) are valued by consumers and conclude on how the information 94 
on food risks may be efficiently transferred to consumers to reduce the gap between objective and 95 
subjective risks. 96 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next section details the conceptual 97 
framework implemented to classify objective and subjective food-borne risk factors: the objective 98 
food safety is declined in terms of hazard and risk; the subjective food safety depends on 99 
(perceived) consumers’ concerns and awareness. Section 3 describes the protocol adopted to review 100 
of literature on consumers’ evaluation of information on food safety, and to examine the effects of 101 
information and types of risks, using an index of the willingness to pay for food safety. The results, 102 
presented in section 4, are organised in three subsections: first, we classify food-borne risk factors 103 
and show the divergences between (scientific) objective and (perceived) subjective food safety; 104 
second, we describe how the index of willingness to pay varies depending on the types of 105 
information and risks; third, we deepen on cases in which the objective and the subjective risks 106 
match. The last section concludes with implications for the food industry and for policymakers. 107 
 108 
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2. Conceptual framework 109 
The definition of food safety covers nutritional quality of food, wide-ranging concerns related to 110 
novel food (e.g. unfamiliar properties of genetically modified food), microbiological and chemical 111 
safety (Ritson and Mai, 1998). Stricto sensu, food safety may be defined as “the inverse of food risk 112 
– the probability of not suffering some hazard from consuming the food in question” (Henson and 113 
Traill, 1993, p. 153). 114 
According to Grunert (2005), food safety may be objective or subjective. Objective food safety is a 115 
concept based on the assessment of the risk of consuming a certain food by scientists and food 116 
experts. Subjective food safety is a concept linked to the consumers’ perception of the risks 117 
associated with the consumption of unsafe food. The level of objective and subjective food risks 118 
may diverge: the former is due to (objective) scientific evidence of food safety; the latter depends 119 
on individuals’ (subjective) perceptions of risks and safety. 120 
 121 
Figure 1. Dimensions of objective and subjective food safety. 122 
 123 
Notes: elaboration on Slovic (1987) and Henson and Traill (1993). 124 
 125 
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From the perspective of objective food safety, the potential adverse impact of consuming unsafe 126 
food has two components: hazard and risk (figure 1). Hazard refers to the severity of the adverse 127 
impact; risk refers to the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard2 (Henson and Traill, 1993). A 128 
particular food-borne risk factor may have a very low hazard (i.e. limited effects) but a high risk 129 
due to a high likelihood of occurrence (e.g. salmonella outbreak). Vice-versa, a food-borne risk 130 
factor may be highly injurious, thus highly hazardous, but it may have a low risk due to a low 131 
likelihood of occurrence (e.g. botulism). 132 
In terms of subjective food safety, risk perception has been widely since the pioneering work by 133 
Fischhoff et al. (1978) and Slovic (1987). Frewer et al. (2005) observe that self-imposed risk tends 134 
to be more acceptable than technology-based risk (i.e. voluntariness). Risk perception tends to be 135 
characterised by an optimistic bias which is the believe that the likelihood of being hit by a risk 136 
factor is lower than the likelihood of the average individual being hit by the same risk factor 137 
(Grunert, 2005). Several studies also demonstrate the relevance of the dimensions of dread and 138 
knowledge or familiarity in risk perception of certain categories such as new technologies or novel 139 
foods (e.g. Scholderer and Frewer, 2003; Frewer et al., 2003, 2004). Our conceptual framework 140 
assumes that the individuals may have aversion to some food-borne risk factor and be indifferent to 141 
others, depending on their judgments about risks and hazards of potential impact of consuming 142 
unsafe food3. However, these reactions (aversion versus indifference) may differ from the opinions 143 
of experts (objective food safety). According to Slovic (1987), the individuals’ judgments are 144 
related to awareness and concerns about potential impacts associated with the consumption of 145 
 
2 According to the risk management guidelines defined in ISO 31000:2018, risk is the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives and is usually expressed in terms of risk sources (i.e. element which alone or in combination has the potential 
to give rise to risk), potential events (i.e. occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances), their consequences 
(i.e. outcome of an event affecting objectives) and their likelihood (i.e. chance of something happening). In our study 
we consider a specific risk source (i.e. food) and potential event (i.e. food-borne risk outbreak) and define its 
consequences as limited or high injurious (i.e. low or high hazard) and its likelihood of occurrence as low (i.e. 
idiosyncratic risk) or high (i.e. pandemic risk). 
3 Variability in risk perceptions may depend on social, cultural, and institutional factors, as well as on intra-individual 
differences determined by past experiences (Barnett and Breakwell, 2001). The experience acquired in past hazardous 
activities is likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge of decision-makers (Santeramo, 2019). However, the relationship 
between risks and past experiences depends on whether the hazardous activity is voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary 
risks are perceived to be an individual choice, whereas involuntary risks are perceived as unfamiliar, uncontrollable and 
involuntary (Twigger-Ross and Breakwell, 1999). 
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unsafe food (figure 1). As for the awareness, the individuals may perceive a food-borne risk factor 146 
as known (i.e. observable, old, immediate in its manifestation of effects, and known to those 147 
exposed to its effects and to science) or unknown (i.e. unobservable, new, delayed in its 148 
manifestation of effects, and unknown to those exposed to its effects and to science). In terms of 149 
concerns, a food-borne risk factor may be perceived as not dreadful (i.e. characterised by 150 
controllability, not catastrophic potential, not fatal consequences, equitable distribution of risks and 151 
benefits, voluntary) or dreadful (i.e. characterised by lack of control, catastrophic potential, fatal 152 
consequences, inequitable distribution of risks and benefits, involuntary). 153 
 154 
3. Methodological approach 155 
3.1. Search strategy and inclusion/exclusion criteria 156 
We systematically reviewed the literature on consumers’ evaluations of information on food safety, 157 
following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 158 
protocol (Moher et al., 2009; Shamseer et al., 2015). The systematic review, conducted in June 159 
2019, includes articles published in Scopus. We limited the search to the subject area “Economics, 160 
Econometrics and Finance” to select only articles published in top field journals. 161 
We run 6 separate searches to identify a set of articles (708) which contains all possible 162 
combinations of keywords in their title, abstract or keywords. We used the following string: 163 
[“willingness to pay”] AND [“food safety”] AND [“behaviour” OR “choice” OR “consumer”] 164 
AND [“claim” OR “label”]. After removing duplicates, the articles (193) were screened based on 165 
the information contained in their title, abstract, and full text: a set of 112 articles were assessed for 166 
eligibility, 72 articles were included in the qualitative synthesis, and 38 of them were included in 167 
the quantitative analysis (figure 2, table 1). 168 
 169 
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Figure 2. Process of articles’ selection. 170 
 171 
Source: elaboration on PRISMA flow diagram. 172 
[Table 1] 173 
In order to be included in the sample, the articles had to meet two general criteria: (i) the provision 174 
of consumers’ attitudes and responses to information in a food safety context; (ii) the detection of 175 
information on consumers’ intention to buy or pay for information on food safety. The first criterion 176 
allowed us to select articles on consumers’ perspective. The second criterion limited the results to 177 
the articles containing valuations of information on food safety (as a function of the reported 178 
parameter). The articles that did not meet the inclusion criteria were excluded from the sample. 179 
Finally, we did not consider conference proceedings, but only peer-reviewed articles published in 180 
English, so to make our analysis widely and easily replicable (Dias and Mendes, 2018). 181 
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 182 
3.2. Data extraction 183 
From the set of 38 articles included in the quantitative synthesis, we collected the following data: (i) 184 
general information on the article, (ii) information on methodological and structural issues, and (iii) 185 
specific information related to food safety. In particular, we retrieved the list of authors, the year of 186 
publication, the journal in which the article is published, the subject area to which the journal 187 
belongs, other than the subject area “Economics, Econometrics and Finance”, the rank of the 188 
journal provided by the Scimago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) at the date of publication as 189 
refereed to the subject area “Economics, Econometrics and Finance” the number of citations for 190 
each article, collected in July 12, 2019, and the title, scope, and main findings. 191 
As for information related to methodological and structural issues, we reported the experimental 192 
designs used to conduct the research (e.g. choice experiment, field experiment, experimental 193 
auction), the empirical models used to analyses survey data (e.g. random parameter logit model, 194 
multinomial logit model, probit model, mixed logit model), the sample size, the country analysed in 195 
the article, and the specific product under investigation in the article and related product category 196 
(e.g. meat, fish, dairy, fruit and vegetables). 197 
As for the specific information related to food safety, we extracted the food-borne risk factors under 198 
investigation in the article (e.g. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy –BSE– crisis, new technologies, 199 
mycotoxin contamination, dioxin contamination), the estimated coefficients and related standard 200 
errors (or t-statistics) for label and/or claim related to food safety, a detailed description of label 201 
and/or claim related to food safety (e.g. fed with direct-fed microbials, vaccinated against 202 
Escherichia coli, recombinant Bovine somatotropin –rBST– free, BSE tested), the estimated 203 
coefficients and related standard errors (or t-statistics) for price, the currency, quantity, and 204 
reference price4 available in the market for the product under investigation, the reported willingness 205 
 
4 Following Lusk et al. (2005), we used the average value of the price treatments as reference price in articles where a 
reference price is not given. 
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to pay (WTP) for label and/or claim related to food safety, if available, and the formula used to 206 
compute WTP, if available. 207 
Due to multiple estimates per article, we collected 403 observations. For each observation of the 208 
same article, we took note of substantial differences, such as the label and/or claim to which the 209 
estimated parameter refers to, the specification of the empirical model (e.g. basic, additional control 210 
factors), the sample size and its characteristics (e.g. whole sample or a specific segment). The 211 
information on standard errors (or t-statistics) allowed us to select only relevant data: after 212 
removing not statistically significant observations, the final sample consists of 257 observations5. 213 
Following the conceptual framework described in section 2 (figure 1), we classified each food-214 
borne risk factor under investigation in terms of dimensions of objective and subjective food safety. 215 
We adopted the classification used in Henson and Traill (1993) and distinguished between hazards 216 
and risks associated with a food-borne risk factor. According to the severity of adverse 217 
consequences, a categorical variable classifies food-borne risk factors in low hazard (category equal 218 
to -1), baseline hazard (category equal to 0), high hazard (category equal to 1). Depending on the 219 
likelihood of occurrence, a categorical variable equals -1 for idiosyncratic risk, 0 for the baseline 220 
risk, 1 for pandemic risk. We replicated the taxonomy of Slovic (1987) to describe the food-borne 221 
risk factors analysed in our sample of articles according to individuals’ perception in terms of 222 
awareness and concern. We used a categorical variable to classify a food-borne risk factor in known 223 
(category equal to -1), baseline awareness (category equal to 0), unknown (category equal to 1). 224 
Another categorical variable equals -1 for food-borne risk factors perceived as not dreadful, 0 for 225 
the baseline concern, 1 for food-borne risk factors perceived as dreadful. The categorical variables 226 
for dimensions of objective and subjective food safety are synthesised in table 2. 227 
[Table 2] 228 
We also generalised information retrieved from the detailed description of label and/or claim related 229 
to food safety so to have 5 types of label on food safety. A dummy variable identified observations 230 
 
5 The initial sample consisted of 40 articles and 280 observations. We removed two articles (Ifft et al., 2012 and 
Savchenko et al., 2018) since they contain not statistically significant observations for our variable of interest. 
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referred to “free” label (e.g. hormone-free, antibiotic-free, rBST free, GMO-free). Another dummy 231 
equals 1 if the estimated parameter for information on food safety indicates that a product is treated 232 
against food-borne risk factors (e.g. fed with direct-fed microbials, vaccinated against Escherichia 233 
coli, BSE tested), and 0 otherwise. Further dummies include labels to indicate if a product is safe 234 
(e.g. enhanced food safety) or traced (e.g. DNA traced). Lastly, a dummy variable equals 1 if the 235 
estimated parameter for information on food safety is related to inspections (e.g. inspected by FDA, 236 
inspected by USDA, inspected by private third parties). 237 
Several computational techniques are used to derive WTP. For instance, while most articles (e.g. 238 
Loureiro and Umberger, 2007; Grebitus et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2017) adopt the traditional ratio 239 
between the parameter estimated for food safety and the negative of the estimated parameter for 240 
price, some articles (e.g. Tonsor, 2011; Wolf et al., 2011) multiply this ratio by 2, due to the use of 241 
effect coded variables for information on food safety. In other cases, formulas reported for WTP are 242 
not replicable. In order to avoid the loss of information on WTP (in case of WTP not reported) and 243 
due to the adoption of different methods to derive WTP, we built an ad hoc normalised index of 244 
WTP, based on the information on food safety. 245 
 246 
3.3. Deriving an index of WTP for information on food safety 247 
The articles in the sample are choice experiments6 simulating real-world decisions, developed under 248 
the random utility theory (McFadden, 1974) and Lancaster’s theory (1966) to determine the utility 249 
the n-th individual obtains choosing the j-th alternative. According to Lancaster’s theory (1966), the 250 
utility is derived from the characteristics (attributes) of the products: the individuals perceive 251 
differentiated products as a set of different attributes, independently evaluated at the time of 252 
decision according to individual preferences. The utility function is as follows: 253 
 𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗;       with   𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝜷′𝒙𝑛𝑗 (1) 
 
6 Observations based on other experimental designs (e.g. field experiment, experimental auction) were lost during the 
process of selecting statistically significant parameters. 
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where the utility of individual n from the alternative j (𝑈𝑛𝑗) is a function of a deterministic 254 
component (𝑉𝑛𝑗) and a stochastic component (𝜀𝑛𝑗), unknown and treated as random. 𝑉𝑛𝑗 is linear 255 
and separable in observable attributes of the alternatives (𝒙𝑛𝑗), and 𝜷′ is a vector of random 256 
parameters representing individual preferences. The estimates of random parameters, 𝜷′, are 257 
interpreted in relative terms as they represent changes in utility with respect to the omitted 258 
alternative. 259 
Individuals maximise their utility according to their budget constraints (Lancaster, 1966). If the 260 
utility is additively separable, individuals have to solve a set of maximisation problems for each 261 
product attribute. Given the stochastic nature of the utility function, the maximisation problem is 262 
solved probabilistically: 263 
 
𝑃𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑛𝑖 > 𝑈𝑛𝑗); ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, ∀𝐽                     = 𝑃𝑟(𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗); ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ∀𝐽= 𝑃𝑟(𝜀𝑛𝑗 − 𝜀𝑛𝑖 < 𝑉𝑛𝑗 − 𝑉𝑛𝑖); ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ∀𝐽  (2) 
According to the equation (2), the probability of choosing alternative i (𝑃𝑛𝑖) equals the probability 264 
that the associated utility (𝑈𝑛𝑖) will provide the highest utility for the n-th individual among a set of 265 
J alternatives. 266 
Based on this framework, from each article of the sample, we collected parameters representing the 267 
individual preferences for food safety (𝛽𝑘) and for price (𝛽𝑝) attributes of the product. We derived 268 
an index of WTP for information on food safety using the following formula: 269 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑊𝑇𝑃 = (− 𝛽𝑘𝛽𝑝) 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓⁄  (3) 
The WTP is computed as ratio between the estimated parameter for food safety and the negative of 270 
the parameter estimated for price (− 𝛽𝑘 𝛽𝑝⁄ ): each ratio is the price change associated with food 271 
safety attribute in a given product. We normalise the derived WTP using a reference price for the 272 
product (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓): this normalisation clear differences in terms of timing, units of measure (e.g. 273 
kilograms, pounds) and currencies. The normalising procedure of WTP is a well-adopted technique 274 
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in meta-analyses involving evaluation of labelled attributes (e.g. Lusk et al., 2005; Deselnicup et al., 275 
2013). 276 
The index computed in equation (3) is a percent variation in WTP and represents the premium price 277 
for the information on food safety. A detailed analysis of premium prices for information on food 278 
safety, reported in table 3 shows that, on average, consumers are willing to pay about 40-50% more 279 
for having more information on food safety. However, cross-country variability exists, as shown by 280 
the heterogeneous premium prices across currencies. The observations for Vietnam Dong (VND) 281 
are related to the study by Thai et al. (2017) who investigated consumers’ preferences and WTP for 282 
different attributes of Vietnamese Good Agricultural Practices (VietGAP) vegetables. The deviation 283 
found for VND is abnormally low and distant from the sample average: thus, we opt for the 284 
elimination of these observation from the sample to avoid biased results. The final sample consists 285 
of 251 valid observations. 286 
[Table 3] 287 
Besides the case of VND, Euro (EUR) and Japanese Yen (JPY) tend to be the most (+111.76%) and 288 
the least (+25.64%) sensitive currencies, respectively. We also observe a great variability across 289 
product categories: dairy products are more sensitive in countries using British pound (GBP, 290 
+116.52%) or Chinese Yuan (CNY, +101.32%) than countries using US Dollar (USD, +16.72%); in 291 
contrast, the premium price for meat-based products is the highest in countries using USD 292 
(+57.49%) and the lowest in countries using GBP (+19.12%); the European countries are more 293 
sensitive to fish products (+315.56%). 294 
 295 
3.4. Quantitative analysis of meta-data 296 
We followed a meta-analytical approach to investigated how premium prices for information on 297 
food safety (i.e. IndexWTP) is affected by label information regarding food safety, as well as by the 298 
objective and subjective dimensions of food safety. We run a least square regression of the 299 
following empirical model: 300 
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 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑊𝑇𝑃 = 𝜆 + 𝚱ρ + 𝚾𝜑 + 𝚭ω + ν (4) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑊𝑇𝑃 is a 251×1 vector of observations on the dependent variable (i.e. index of WTP); 𝜆 301 
is a 251×1 vector of constant terms; 𝚱 is a 251×4 matrix of variables including label information on 302 
food safety, ρ is the corresponding 4×1 vector of regression coefficients; 𝚾 is a 251×m matrix of 303 
interaction terms between label information on food safety and dimensions of objective and 304 
subjective food safety, 𝜑 is the corresponding m×1 vector of regression coefficients; 𝚭 is a 251×12 305 
matrix of control factors related to the publication process, 𝜔 is the corresponding 12×1 vector of 306 
regression coefficients; 𝜈 is a 251×1 vector of error terms assumed to be independently and 307 
identically distributed. 308 
The matrix 𝚱 includes dummy variables for label information on the level of food safety (i.e. 309 
treated, safe, inspected, traced). In our sample, the observations associated to products treated 310 
against food-borne risk factors (e.g. fed with direct-fed microbials, vaccinated against Escherichia 311 
coli, BSE tested) are 11.2%. The labels indicating that a product is generally safe (e.g. enhanced 312 
food safety) or traced (e.g. DNA traced) account for 17.1% and 30.7% of cases. Lastly, 20.3% of 313 
observations include label information on food safety related to institutional inspections (e.g. 314 
inspected by FDA, inspected by USDA, inspected by private third parties) (table 4). The remaining 315 
observations refer to “free” label (e.g. hormone-free, antibiotic-free, rBST free, GMO-free): this 316 
variable serves as baseline7. 317 
To capture the role of information on different types of food-borne risk factors, the matrix 𝚾 318 
includes, alternatively, different interaction terms between information on food safety and 319 
dimensions of objective and subjective food safety. First, we create interactions between different 320 
labels and food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk (objective 321 
dimensions of food safety), and unknown or perceived as dreadful by consumers (subjective 322 
dimensions of food safety). The label ‘treated’ is associated with food-borne risk factors hazardous 323 
(2.4%), risky (2.4%) and unknown (11.2%); the label ‘safe’ is associated with food-borne risk 324 
 
7 The choice of this variable as baseline is motivated by the higher correlation of such a variable with dummies for other 
labels (i.e. treated, safe, inspected, traced). 
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factors risky (3.6%) and unknown (3.6%); the label ‘inspected’ is associated with food-borne risk 325 
factors hazardous (1.2%), risky (1.2%), unknown (8.0%) and dreadful (7.2%); the label ‘traced’ is 326 
associated with food-borne risk factors unknown (14.7%) and dreadful (6.4%) (table A.1). Second, 327 
we control for the extreme dimensions of food safety. We observe a match between labels with 328 
food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard and pandemic risk for ‘treated’ (2.4%) and 329 
‘inspected’ (1.2%), and with food-borne risk factors unknown and dreadful for ‘inspected’ (6.8%) 330 
and ‘traced’ (2.8%); in contrast, the match with food-borne risk factors characterised by low hazard 331 
and idiosyncratic risk occurs for ‘treated’ (2.4%) and ‘inspected’ (1.2%), whereas food-borne risk 332 
factors known and not dreadful are associated with the labels ‘inspected’ (6.8%) and ‘traced’ (2.8%) 333 
(table A.1). Lastly, we control for the effects of labels when objective and subjective food safety are 334 
the same, that is when hazardous or risky food-borne factors are unknown for consumers or 335 
perceived as dreadful. The unknown food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard or 336 
pandemic risk are associated with the labels ‘treated’ (2.4%) and ‘inspected’ (1.2%); in 3.6% of 337 
cases the label ‘safe’ is associated with unknown and pandemic risk (table A.1). 338 
As in Santeramo and Lamonaca (2019), the matrix of control factors, 𝚭, includes information on the 339 
prestige and subject area of the journal in which each article is published. Dummies control for 340 
articles published in journals in 25th (Q1), 50th (Q2) and 75th (Q3) percentiles, according to the rank 341 
provided by Scimago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) at the date of publication. Note that the sample 342 
does not include studies published in journals ranked as Q4, while observations represent 28%, 343 
55%, 15% in Q1, Q2, and Q3 journals, respectively: the remaining 2% of observations belong to an 344 
article published in a journal not ranked in SJR (Owusu-Sekyere et al., 2018) and serves as a 345 
baseline. Recall that we selected articles published in journals belonging to the subject area 346 
Economics, Econometrics and Finance, another dummy indicates if the journal in the sample 347 
belongs to the subject area Agricultural and Biological Sciences: this occurs in 73% of cases and 348 
allows us to account for the multidisciplinary character of the issue. 𝚭 includes control variables for 349 
the presence of influential authors. We have dummies which indicate scholars who authored at least 350 
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three articles in the sample: they are C. Grebitus (co-author of 3 articles), M. Chen (co-author of 3 351 
articles), W. Hu (co-author of 6 articles), N.J. Olynk Widmar (co-author of 4 articles), D.L. Ortega 352 
(co-author of 3 articles), H. Wang (co-author of 5 articles), L. Wu (co-author of 5 articles), D. Zhu 353 
(co-author of 3 articles). 354 
The model in equation (4) is estimated through least squares in different specifications. First, we 355 
estimate the effects of information on food safety and test the robustness of the model controlling 356 
for different combinations of control factors. Once the role of label information in affecting 357 
premium prices for food safety has been identified, we assessed to what extent the effect of label 358 
information on food safety vary depending on dimensions of objective and subjective food safety. 359 
In particular, we disentangled the net effect of label information on food safety associated with 360 
food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk (objective dimensions of food 361 
safety), and unknown or perceived as dreadful (subjective dimensions of food safety). We then 362 
quantified the effects of label information on food safety associated with food-borne risk factors 363 
objectively least (i.e. low hazard and idiosyncratic risk) and most (i.e. high hazard and pandemic 364 
risk) dangerous, and subjectively most hazardous and risky (i.e. unknown and dreadful)8. Lastly, we 365 
controlled for the effects of label information on food safety when the subjective perception of 366 
consumers equals the objective risk and hazard associated with a food-borne risk factor9. 367 
 368 
 
8 We do not estimate the counterpart for least hazardous and risky (i.e. known and not dreadful), from a subjective 
perspective, due to the lack of data related to food-born risk factors known and perceived as not dreadful (see table 
A.1). 
9 We do not estimate the counterpart for food-born risk factors characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk and 
perceived as dreadful by consumers, due to the lack of evidence in our sample (see table A.1). 
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4. Results and discussion 369 
4.1. Classification of food-borne risk factors 370 
Following the conceptual framework described in section 2, we classified each food-borne risk 371 
factor, analysed in the sample of articles10, in terms of objective and subjective dimensions of food 372 
safety (figure 3). 373 
 374 
Figure 3. Classification of food-borne factors according to dimensions of objective and subjective food safety. 375 
 376 
Notes: BSE crisis, Dioxin contamination, E. coli outbreak, Food adulteration, Mercury levels, New technologies 377 
(GMOs, clones) are food-borne factors generally related to seafood and meat-based products whose perception is 378 
affected by the specific origin of food products (i.e. local versus imported production). 379 
 380 
From an objective perspective, most articles analyse food-borne risk factors characterised by low 381 
(48.2%) or baseline (45.8%) hazard, and idiosyncratic (46.6%) or baseline (41.8%) risk (table 4). 382 
Some examples of food-borne risk factors whose effects are both generally limited (i.e. low hazard) 383 
and less likely to occur (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) are BSE crisis (e.g. Peterson and Burbidge, 2012; 384 
Lim and Hu, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017), dioxin contamination of animal feed (e.g. Wägeli et al., 385 
 
10 The classification of food-borne risk factors, reported in figure 3, has been validated by a panel of experts (both 
biologists and food scientists). 
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2016), new technologies and genetically modified food (e.g. Brooks and Lusk, 2012; Grebitus et al., 386 
2013; Kemper et al., 2018). They are rather frequent in our sample, representing 42.6% of the cases. 387 
Food-borne risk factors that are highly hazardous and risky, such as chemical contamination (e.g. 388 
Glenk et al., 2012) or mercury levels (e.g. Fonner and Sylvia, 2015), occur in 6.0% of the cases 389 
only (figure 3, table 4). 390 
As for the subjective dimensions of food safety, most of food-borne risk factors are perceived as not 391 
dreadful (39.8%) or characterised by baseline concern (41.8%), while they are unknown for 392 
consumers in 54.2% of the cases (table 6). Only BSE crisis (e.g. Peterson and Burbidge, 2012; Lim 393 
and Hu, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017) are unknown for consumers and perceived as dreadful (14.4%), 394 
whereas several food-borne risk factors are perceived as not dreadful although unknown (39.8%), 395 
examples are chemical contamination (e.g. Glenk et al., 2012), food contamination and adulteration 396 
(e.g. Ortega et al., 2014), mercury levels (e.g. Fonner and Sylvia, 2015), Escherichia coli outbreak 397 
(e.g. Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019) (figure 3, table 4). 398 
[Table 4] 399 
As evident from figure 3, there is frequently a discrepancy between objective and subjective food 400 
safety: remarkable examples are the so-called food scares, such as BSE crisis or dioxin 401 
contamination, and certain production technologies, such as food irradiation, genetically modified 402 
food, cloning technologies. We find that the perception of food-borne factors generally related to 403 
seafood and meat-based products (e.g. BSE crisis, dioxin contamination, e. coli outbreak, food 404 
adulteration, mercury levels, new technologies) tends to be affected by the specific origin of food 405 
products (i.e. local versus imported production). As suggested in Ortega et al. (2014), given the 406 
increased attention to food safety scandals at the international level, consumers tend to have a 407 
higher valuation for domestic rather than for imported products. While this is an opportunity for 408 
domestic producers to dominate the national market, net-importer countries may benefit from more 409 
stringent inspection systems to ensure that imported products comply with proper safety 410 
requirements. The origin of food products is directly related to concerns about food safety. In fact, 411 
19 
consumers tend to use information on origin of food as a food safety cue (Santeramo and 412 
Lamonaca, 2020a, b). For instance, Umberger et al. (2003) conclude on the preference of US 413 
consumers for domestic beef due to food safety concerns about imported beef; similarly, Lewis et 414 
al. (2017) found that the British and the German consumers are willing to pay a premium for 415 
domestic beef as compared to imported beef and the premium price increases as the importance 416 
consumers attach to food safety increases. Consumers’ preferences are likely to be influenced by 417 
cultural identities which are determinant in orienting consumers in their evaluation of food risk 418 
(Kemper et al., 2018). In cases in which major food scares are perceived, the perception of risks 419 
tends to drive food choices and lead individuals to avoid certain categories or brands until the 420 
situation returns normal; in the case of new technologies, which use is perceived as unsafe, the 421 
individuals tend to develop negative attitudes towards their use (Grunert, 2005). Although new 422 
technologies are introduced to provide advantages to consumers, they are applied in different 423 
country-specific regulatory frameworks that tend to drive the overall perception of consumers 424 
(Grebitus et al., 2018; Santeramo et al., 2018). 425 
The wide divergence between subjective perceptions and objective evidence of the risk of a hazard 426 
occurring is a well-known characteristic of consumers’ attitudes to risk in food consumption. While 427 
scientists are more concerned about microbiology contamination, the consumers tend to 428 
overestimate the probability of rare events and underestimate moderate to high probabilities (Cao et 429 
al., 2015). Besides the objectivity of a food-borne risk factor, an optimistic bias occurs in risk 430 
perception: individuals frequently believe that they are less likely to be exposed to a risk than other 431 
individuals, an example is the perception of personal food safety hazards, such as food poisoning 432 
contracted at home or inappropriate dietary choices (Grunert, 2005; Cao et al., 2015). 433 
In our sample, objective equals subjective food safety only in a few cases. For instance, this is true 434 
for Escherichia coli outbreak (e.g. Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019), chemical contamination (e.g. 435 
Glenk et al., 2012), mercury levels (e.g. Fonner and Sylvia, 2015), food contamination and 436 
adulteration (e.g. Ortega et al., 2014), recycled water (Savchenko et al., 2018), unknown for 437 
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consumers, but also characterised by high hazard (6% of cases) or pandemic risk (11.6% of cases) 438 
(figure 3). 439 
 440 
4.2. Analysis of index of WTP for information on food safety 441 
The empirical distribution of the index of WTP for information on food safety in our sample is 442 
shown in figure 4. Excluding the outliers, the index ranges between 0 and 2, it is positive skewed 443 
(skewness equal to 4.94) and it is distributed with mean 0.59 and standard deviation 0.91, with a 444 
median value equal to 0.33. 445 
The premium prices for information on food safety conveyed through labels ‘safe’, ‘inspected’ and 446 
‘traced’ tend to be lower and less dispersed than the premium price for a label including information 447 
about whether a certain product is treated against a specific food-borne risk factor (e.g. vaccinated 448 
against Escherichia coli, BSE tested): on average, consumers are willing to pay 42.0%, 39.3% and 449 
42.2% more for products carrying the labels ‘safe’, ‘inspected’ and ‘traced’, respectively, but the 450 
premium price is 90.4% greater for the label ‘tested’. The large variability of the index for the label 451 
‘tested’ (0.649) is plausibly due to the fact that, in general, the impact of information about an issue 452 
with potential negative effects (e.g. BSE crisis) is larger than that with positive effects (e.g. 453 
enhanced safety, traceability) (Cao et al., 2015). 454 
 455 
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Figure 4. Distribution of index of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for information on food safety. 456 
 457 
Notes: Kernel density is built on values of index of WTP within 5th and 95th percentiles. 458 
 459 
The figure 5 shows the empirical distribution of the index of WTP for information on food safety in 460 
terms of dimensions of food safety. Considering objective dimensions of food safety, the higher the 461 
hazard or the risk, the lower the dispersion of the index. On average, the premium price is 31.3% 462 
greater for products potentially subject to high hazard and 37.5% higher for products vulnerable to 463 
pandemic risks. As for perceived food safety, the index of WTP is almost equally distributed across 464 
different levels of concern, with an average premium price of 49.9% for not dreadful risks and 465 
42.1% for dreadful risks. Differently, the premium price for information on food safety increases as 466 
the awareness of consumers decreases. On average, consumers are willing to pay 19.7% more to be 467 
informed on known risks, but 48.7% more, for information on unknown food-borne risk factors. 468 
Our results suggest that the consumers tend to give more importance to unknown (e.g. BSE crisis) 469 
rather than to known (e.g. melamine contamination) food-born risk factors. For instance, they 470 
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would pay a premium price higher for BSE-tested beef (+48.7%) as compared to powder milk 471 
traced to avoid melamine contamination (+19.7%). Differences in WTP for unknown and known 472 
food-borne factors may be related to the immediacy of health consequences. The longer the time 473 
lapse between consumption and symptoms due to food-borne factors, the higher the willingness to 474 
pay to avoid long-term concerns (Lagervist et al., 2013). As observed in Cao et al. (2015), 475 
consumers systematically overestimate events with relatively low risk, such as technological-related 476 
food contamination (i.e. unknown food-borne risk factors), but underestimate factors that may 477 
represent a threat to human health, such as Escherichia coli outbreak or chemical contamination (i.e. 478 
highly hazardous, but perceived as not dreadful). 479 
 480 
Figure 5. Distribution of index of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for objective and subjective dimensions of food safety. 481 
 482 
Notes: Distributions consider values of index of WTP within 5th and 95th percentiles. 483 
 484 
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In the few cases in which the discrepancy between objective and subjective food safety is null, 485 
consumers are willing to pay 23.0% and 41.5% more for products potentially exposed to unknown 486 
events respectively characterised by high hazard and pandemic risk. 487 
 488 
4.3. Meta-regression results 489 
The results reported in table 5 show how the WTP is affected by labels providing information on 490 
food safety. The information on food safety, conveyed through labels ‘treated’, ‘safe’ and 491 
‘inspected’, and the premium price for food safety are positively correlated with premium price. 492 
The results are consistent with previous studies which found substantial WTP estimates for products 493 
with different food safety labels (e.g. Wongprawmas and Canavari, 2017). The results are robust to 494 
different combinations of control factors. Coefficients estimated for labels capture most variability 495 
in the WTP index. A few exceptions are the negative and significant coefficients estimated for the 496 
dummies Olynk Widmar N.J. and Agricultural and Biological Sciences: note that the former, 497 
significant at the 5% level in the specification (3), loses significance in favour of the latter in the 498 
specification (4). 499 
Focusing on the results reported in column (4), we observe that a label containing information that a 500 
certain product is treated against a specific food-borne risk factor increases by 71.4% the premium 501 
price for that product. A study that examines WTP for two food safety enhancing technologies that 502 
would offer protection against major food-borne pathogens (Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019) found 503 
that consumers are willing to pay to be protected against harmful pathogens, and place a premium 504 
on ground beef treated against Escherichia coli bacteria. 505 
Our results also show that consumers are willing to pay 53.6% more for a product carrying a label 506 
certifying its safety. As shown in previous studies (e.g. Wolf et al., 2011; Carlucci et al., 2017), 507 
consumers are generally willing to pay substantial premiums for products with assured food safety 508 
enhancement. 509 
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In addition, if the food safety of a product is inspected by public or private third parties, the 510 
premium price for the inspected product is 43.7% greater. This evidence echoes findings from 511 
previous studies highlighting that consumers are concerned about BSE and are willing to pay extra 512 
for certainty BSE-tested beef over the standard government surveillance and protocols (e.g. Lim et 513 
al., 2013; Lim and Hu, 2016). 514 
Our results suggest that consumers would be willing to pay a price premium of up to 168.7% for 515 
food products that are treated against a specific food-borne risk factor, certified to be safe, tested or 516 
inspected by public or third parties. 517 
[Table 5] 518 
Once the effects of information on food safety is identified, we assess to what extent these effects 519 
vary if associated with food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk 520 
(objective dimensions of food safety), and unknown or perceived as dreadful (subjective 521 
dimensions of food safety). 522 
[Table 6] 523 
The main results are confirmed: information on food safety conveyed through labels and premium 524 
prices for food safety are positively correlated (see table 5). We observe a few exceptions in 525 
specifications that controls for subjective dimensions of food safety. In particular, the coefficient 526 
estimated for label ‘safe’ loses statistical significance in the specification that controls for unknown 527 
food-borne risk factors. As for the coefficients estimated for labels ‘inspected’ and ‘traced’, the 528 
former loses statistical significance in the specification that controls for food-borne risk factors 529 
perceived as dreadful; the latter gains statistical significance in the specification that controls for 530 
unknown food-borne risks. The instability of the estimated coefficients is plausibly dependent on 531 
the subjective perception of food safety. As also demonstrated in Yin et al. (2019), consumers with 532 
different levels of food safety risk perceptions have drastically different WTP for diverse labels. In 533 
fact, from a subjective perspective, labels are inefficient vehicles of information on food safety, 534 
when products are likely to be affected by food-borne risk factor unknown or perceived as dreadful. 535 
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If a product is potentially exposed to an unknown food-borne risk factor, the premium price for that 536 
product, carrying the label ‘traced’, decreases by 112.2% and the net effect of information is 537 
negative (-51.6%). Besides this exception, the index of WTP does not vary across dimensions of 538 
subjective food safety. With uncertainty, consumers tend to interpret information according to their 539 
needs, thus inadequately selecting signals (Verbeke 2005). 540 
Considering food-borne risk factors objectively hazardous and risky, premium prices for labels 541 
‘treated’ and ‘inspected’ tend to be reduced. The estimated coefficients are significantly negative. In 542 
particular, the premium price for a label containing information that a certain product is treated 543 
against a food-borne risk factor is reduced by 113.3% if the severity of consequences is high and 544 
even more, by 143.5%, if the risk is pandemic. Similarly, premium prices for products inspected by 545 
public or private third parties are 123.7% and 157.9% lower if associated with food-borne risk 546 
factors characterised by high hazard and pandemic risk, respectively. Overall, the net effect of 547 
information on food safety is negative. The reduction in premium prices ranges between 17.7% and 548 
40.1% for label ‘treated’ and between 71.4% and 99.4% for label ‘inspected’, depending on the 549 
objective dimension of food safety. If a food-borne risk factor is objectively hazardous and risky, 550 
labels are ineffective in communicating the safety of a food product. The results suggest that when 551 
the price of information is higher as compared to the marginal expected benefit, consumers may 552 
rationally choose to remain imperfectly informed about food safety issues (Cao et al., 2015). 553 
In order to corroborate our results, we quantify the effect of label information on food safety 554 
associated with food-borne risk factors, objectively least (i.e. low hazard and idiosyncratic risk) and 555 
most (i.e. high hazard and pandemic risk) dangerous11: the results are reported in table 7. 556 
[Table 7] 557 
The information on food safety conveyed through labels and WTP for food safety are positively 558 
correlated, however most of the estimated coefficients for labels lose statistical significance. The 559 
 
11 We also quantified the effect of information on food safety associated with food-born risk factors subjectively most 
hazardous and risky (i.e. unknown and dreadful): the results, omitted, reveal no variability in the index of WTP. We do 
not estimate the counterpart for least hazardous and risky (i.e. known and not dreadful), from a subjective perspective, 
due to the lack of data related to food-born risk factors known and perceived as not dreadful. 
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information on food safety may eventually eliminate premium prices for products carrying such 560 
labels if consumers become aware of the objective risk associated with the consumption of products 561 
potentially exposed to hazards and not ensuring, through labels, adequate levels of food safety 562 
(Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019). 563 
Consumers WPT increases by 185.6% if a label informs that a certain product is treated against a 564 
food-borne risk factor characterised by low hazard and idiosyncratic risk but is reduced by 113.3% 565 
if the food-borne risk factor is objectively hazardous and risky. This evidence suggests a low 566 
usefulness of a specific label informing that a certain product is treated against a food-borne risk 567 
factor: indeed, premium prices tend to increase only on condition of objective food safety (low 568 
hazard and idiosyncratic risk), but not if the food-borne risk factor is more likely to occur with 569 
severe consequences. 570 
Consumers are willing to pay 80.7% less for a product carrying a label ensuring traceability if the 571 
product is associated with food-borne risk factors both less likely to occur with limited 572 
consequences and more likely to occur with severe consequences. In addition, if food safety of a 573 
product is inspected by public or private third parties, the premium price for the inspected product is 574 
123.7% lower if the food-borne risk factor associated with the consumption of that product is 575 
hazardous and risky. Furthermore, in considering the positive relationship between the labels and 576 
the premium price for food safety, the net effect is negative both for the labels ‘traced’ (-29.6%) and 577 
‘inspected’ (-71.4%). 578 
Lastly, we control for the effects of label information on food safety when the subjective perception 579 
of consumers equals the objective risk and hazard associated with a food-borne risk factor. Table 8 580 
shows the results for food-borne risk factors unknown for consumers and characterised by high 581 
hazard or pandemic risk12. 582 
[Table 8] 583 
 
12 We do not estimate the counterpart for food-born risk factors characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk and 
perceived as dread by consumers, due to the lack of evidence in our sample. 
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The information on food safety, conveyed through labels ‘treated’, ‘safe’ and ‘inspected’, and 584 
premium prices for food safety are positively correlated, confirming previous results (see table 5). If 585 
food-borne risk factors unknown by consumers are characterised by high hazard or pandemic risk, 586 
the premium prices decrease by about 113.3-143.5% for a treated product and about 123.7-157.9% 587 
for an inspected product. As suggested in Cao et al. (2015), when being exposed to relevant risk 588 
information about food safety, consumers tend to increase their risk perception and decrease their 589 
WTP. 590 
 591 
5. Concluding remarks 592 
Food-borne infection causes considerable illness, heavily affecting healthcare systems. The risks in 593 
the food sector are many, of various nature and, potentially, responsible of direct and indirect costs 594 
(Gallo et al., 2020). Given the spread of food-borne infections, the assessment of food risks is a 595 
relevant issue for the food industry and for policymakers (Ververis et al., 2020). If food risks are 596 
numerous, and of a complex nature, the rationale guiding consumers’ choices becomes challenging. 597 
The channels through which the information may be conveyed and the cognitive process guiding 598 
consumers in processing information are certainly factors that influence how consumers make 599 
decisions under uncertainty. 600 
Following a systematic and meta-analytical approach, we evaluated how different sources and types 601 
of risks (i.e. objective and subjective) are perceived by the consumers, in order to investigate how 602 
the information on food risks may be efficiently communicated. 603 
The results revealed that information on food safety, conveyed through labels, exerts a positive 604 
influence on premium prices for food safety. Consumers would be willing to pay a price premium 605 
of up to 168.7% for food products that are treated against a specific food-borne risk factor, certified 606 
to be safe, tested or inspected by public or third parties. Consider a meat-based product, ground beef 607 
with an average reference price of 4.22 USD/lb. The consumers may be willing to pay up to 11.34 608 
USD/lb more for the same ground beef if it carried labels ‘treated’, ‘safe’ and ‘inspected’. 609 
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We found that the positive effect of label information on food safety is almost nullified when we 610 
consider both objective and subjective risks. In fact, labels are inefficient vehicles of information on 611 
food safety, when products are likely to be affected by food-borne risk factors, objectively 612 
hazardous and risky. The net effect of label information on food safety is detrimental for premium 613 
prices. Not surprising, when the price of information is higher as compared to the marginal 614 
expected benefit, consumers may rationally choose to remain imperfectly informed about food 615 
safety issues (Cao et al., 2015). We derived similar conclusions for premium prices for products 616 
potentially exposed to unknown food risks perceived as dread by consumers. With uncertainty, 617 
consumers tend to interpret information according to their needs, thus inadequately selecting signals 618 
(Verbeke 2005). 619 
Overall, the results suggest that, when exposed to relevant risk information about food safety, 620 
consumers tend to increase their risk perception and decrease their premium prices for information 621 
on food safety. Our evidence is in line with findings from Cao et al. (2015) and Britwum and 622 
Yiannaka (2019) who suggest that information about food safety may eventually eliminate premium 623 
prices for products carrying such labels, if consumers become aware of the objective risk associated 624 
with the consumption of products potentially exposed to hazards. 625 
Our results have important implications for the food industry, as well as for policymakers and 626 
institutions. Food-borne factors are frequently characterised by asymmetric information. In several 627 
cases, the producers (or sellers) are better informed than consumers on food properties and potential 628 
food safety risk (Grunert, 2005). A remarkable example is the mismatch between the objective and 629 
the subjective risks associated with new technologies, as consumers may be not aware of scientific 630 
evidence. This mismatch tends to reduce with a wider dissemination of scientific evidence (Kemper 631 
et al., 2018). Using labels on safety information may contribute to lower the distance between 632 
(objective) scientific risks and (subjective) perceived risks, reducing inefficiencies arising from 633 
asymmetric information (Ortega et al., 2014). Nonetheless, correctly conveying the information is 634 
challenging and needs to be further deepened (Ritson and Mai, 1998). At the policy level, it is 635 
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important that the information provided to consumers is representative of benefits, so to increase 636 
consumer confidence in information conveyed through labels (Britwum and Yiannaka, 2019) and 637 
prevent both food scares and diseases. 638 
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Tables 854 
Table 1. List of articles included in the quantitative analysis. 855 
Reference Journal Ranka Citationsb Countryc Product category Food-borne risk factor 
Boncinelli et al. (2018) Agribusiness Q2 0 ITA Fish (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Britwum and Yiannaka (2019) Food Policy Q1 0 USA Meat (local) E. coli outbreak 
Brooks and Lusk (2012) Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Q2 8 USA Meat (local) New technologies 
Campbell and Doherty (2013) European Review of Agricultural Economics Q2 15 GBR Meat (local) Food safety 
Carlucci et al. (2017) Marine Resource Economics Q2 12 ITA Fish (local vs. imported) Food safety 
Enneking (2004) European Review of Agricultural Economics Q2 68 DEU Meat (local) Food safety 
Fonner and Sylvia (2015) Marine Resource Economics Q2 24 USA Fish (local vs. no info) Mercury level 
Glenk et al. (2012) Food Policy Q1 6 GBR Beverage (local vs. no info) Chemical contamination 
Grebitus et al. (2013) Food Policy Q1 21 USA Meat (local) New technologies 
Kemper et al. (2018) Food Policy Q1 0 USA Meat (local vs. no info) New technologies 
Lewis et al. (2016) Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Q2 10 USA Sugar (imported) New technologies 
Lewis et al. (2017) Journal of Agricultural Economics Q1 14 GBR Meat (local vs. imported) E. coli outbreak, BSE crisis 
Li et al. (2018) Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics Q3 2 USA Meat (local vs. imported) Food safety 
Lim and Hu (2016) Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics Q2 16 CAN Meat (local vs. imported) BSE crisis 
Lim et al. (2013) Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics Q3 52 USA Meat (local vs. imported) BSE crisis 
Loureiro and Umberger (2007) Food Policy Q2 293 USA Meat (local vs. imported) BSE crisis 
Merritt et al. (2018) Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics Q3 3 USA Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Ortega et al. (2014) Agricultural Economics Q2 13 USA Fish (local vs. imported) Food adulteration 
39 
Ortega et al. (2015) Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Q2 7 USA Fish (local vs. imported) Food adulteration 
Ortega et al. (2011) Food Policy Q1 161 CHN Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Owusu-Sekyere et al. (2018) African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics n.a. 0 GHA Meat (local) Food safety 
Peterson and Burbidge (2012) Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Q2 3 JPN Meat (local vs. imported) BSE crisis 
Savchenko et al. (2018) Food Policy Q1 4 USA Fruit and vegetables (local) Recycled water 
Thai et al. (2017) International Journal of Economic Research Q2 0 VNM Vegetables (local) Chemical contamination 
Tonsor (2011) European Review of Agricultural Economics Q1 35 USA Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Ubilava and Foster (2009) Food Policy Q1 55 GEO Meat (local) Food safety 
Viegas et al. (2014) Journal of Agricultural Economics Q2 13 PRT Meat (local) Food safety 
Wägeli et al. (2016) International Journal of Consumer Studies Q2 18 DEU Dairy (local) Dioxin contamination 
Wolf et al. (2011) Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Q2 28 USA Dairy (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Wongprawmas and Canavari (2017) Food Policy Q1 14 THA Vegetables (local) Food safety 
Wu et al. (2017) Agribusiness Q2 6 CHN Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Wu et al. (2015a) China Agricultural Economic Review Q3 8 CHN Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Wu et al. (2015b) China Economic Review Q2 25 CHN Meat (local vs. no info) Food safety 
Wu et al. (2020) Journal of Agricultural Economics Q1 0 CHN Dairy (local) Food safety 
Xu et al. (2017) Chinese Economy Q2 0 CHN Dairy (local vs. imported) Melamine contamination 
Yin et al. (2017) China Agricultural Economic Review Q3 6 CHN Vegetables (local vs. imported) Food safety 
Yin et al. (2019) Agribusiness Q2 0 CHN Vegetables (local vs. imported) Food safety 
Yin et al. (2018) Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics Q2 1 CHN Dairy (local vs. imported) Melamine contamination 
a Journal rank provided by the Scimago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) at the date of publication and referred to the subject area Economics, Econometrics and Finance. Q1, Q2 856 
and Q3 stands for journals respectively in the 25th, 50th, 75th percentiles, n.a. stands for not available. 857 
b Number of citations collected from Scopus in July 12, 2019. 858 
40 
c Acronyms are Canada (CAN), China (CHN), Germany (DEU), United Kingdom (GBR), Georgia (GEO), Ghana (GHA), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Portugal (PRT), Thailand 859 
(THA), United States (USA), Vietnam (VNM). 860 
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Table 2. Categorical variables for dimensions on food safety. 862 
Dimension Definition 
Value of categorical variables 
-1 0 1 
Objective food safety 
Hazard 
Severity of adverse 
consequences 
Limited injurious 
(low hazard) 
Baseline 
hazard 
High injurious 
(high hazard) 
Risk Likelihood of occurrence 
Low likelihood of occurrence 
(idiosyncratic risk) 
Baseline risk 
High likelihood of occurrence 
(pandemic risk) 
Subjective food safety 
Concern Known vs. unknown 
Observable, immediate, old 
(known) 
Baseline 
concern 
Unobservable, delayed, new 
(unknown) 
Awareness Not dreadful vs. dreadful 
Controllable, not global 
catastrophic, not fatal, voluntary 
(not dreadful) 
Baseline 
awareness 
Uncontrollable, global 
catastrophic, fatal, involuntary 
(dreadful) 
  863 
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Table 3. Analysis of premium prices for information on food safety. 864 
Currency Obs. (%) WTP Reference price Deviation (%) 
CNY  17.9 4.98 9.35 53.30 
of which      
 Meat 60.9 5.52 12.57 43.92 
 Dairy 30.4 5.07 5.00 101.32 
EUR  25.3 3.31 2.96 111.76 
of which      
 Meat 41.5 1.08 3.56 30.30 
 Dairy 46.2 0.48 1.39 34.38 
 Fish 12.3 21.42 6.79 315.56 
GBP  7.8 1.69 4.73 35.66 
of which      
 Meat 20.0 1.31 6.85 19.12 
 Dairy 20.0 3.79 3.25 116.52 
GEL  1.2 3.65 9.00 40.54 
GHc  2.7 3.65 9.00 40.54 
JPY  0.8 57.00 222.34 25.64 
THB  1.2 21.73 50.00 43.46 
USD  40.8 3.29 7.37 44.64 
of which      
 Meat 55.2 4.43 7.70 57.49 
 Dairy 23.8 1.20 7.20 16.72 
 Fish 15.2 3.04 8.69 35.01 
VND  2.3 10.47 10,000.00 0.10 
Notes: Average values reported for willingness to pay (WTP) and reference prices, by currency. The percent deviation 865 
is computed as the ratio between WTP and reference price. Acronyms are Chinese Yuan (CNY), Euro (EUR), British 866 
pound (GBP), Georgian Lari (GEL), Ghana Cedi (GHc), Japanese Yen (JPY), Thailand Baht (THB), US Dollar (USD), 867 
Vietnam Dong (VND). 868 
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Table 4. Percentage of observations for combinations of risk-hazard and awareness-concern. 870 
Dimensions of objective food safety 
 Hazard  
Risk Low Baseline High Total 
Idiosyncratic 42.6 4.0 0.0 46.6 
Baseline 0.0 41.8 0.0 41.8 
Pandemic 5.6 0.0 6.0 11.6 
Total 48.2 45.8 6.0 100.0 
Dimensions of subjective food safety 
 Concern  
Awareness Not dread Baseline Dread Total 
Known 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 
Baseline 0.0 41.8 0.0 41.8 
Unknown 39.8 0.0 14.4 54.2 
Total 39.8 41.8 18.4 100.0 
Notes: total observations are 251. 871 
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Table 5. Effects of information on food safety. 873 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated 0.594*** 0.627*** 0.598** 0.714*** 
 (0.210) (0.224) (0.230) (0.230) 
Safe 0.495*** 0.468** 0.553** 0.536** 
 (0.185) (0.196) (0.225) (0.222) 
Inspected 0.375** 0.406** 0.429** 0.437** 
 (0.177) (0.181) (0.200) (0.196) 
Traced 0.240 0.233 0.185 0.126 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.186) (0.184) 
Journal in 25th percentile  -0.347 -0.208 -0.278 
  (0.385) (0.394) (0.389) 
Journal in 50th percentile  -0.258 0.015 -0.415 
  (0.377) (0.404) (0.422) 
Journal in 75th percentile  -0.448 -0.267 -0.332 
  (0.393) (0.419) (0.412) 
Grebitus C.   -0.206 -0.261 
   (0.288) (0.283) 
Chen M.   -0.505 -0.133 
   (0.355) (0.371) 
Hu W.   -0.026 0.056 
   (0.195) (0.194) 
Olynk Widmar N.J.   -0.599** -0.186 
   (0.272) (0.300) 
Ortega D.L.   0.396 0.844 
   (0.541) (0.552) 
Wang H.   -0.083 -0.620 
   (0.402) (0.434) 
Wu L.   0.147 0.101 
   (0.394) (0.387) 
45 
Zhu D.   -0.462 -0.037 
   (0.537) (0.546) 
Agricultural and Biological Sciences    -0.634*** 
    (0.211) 
Constant 0.285** 0.587 0.501 1.153** 
 (0.124) (0.392) (0.407) (0.455) 
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of the equation (4). The dependent variable is the index of willingness 874 
to pay (WTP) for information on food safety. The explanatory variables are modelled as dummy variables. Column (1) 875 
is the basic specification; control factors added in following specifications: dummies for journal rank in column (2), 876 
dummies for influential authors in column (3), dummy for journal area in column (4). Observations are 251. Standard 877 
errors are in parentheses. 878 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 879 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 880 
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Table 6. Effects of information on food safety associated with food-borne risk factors characterised by high hazard (1), 882 
pandemic risk (2), unknown (3), perceived as dreadful (4). 883 
 Objective dimensions of food safety  Subjective dimensions of food safety 
Explanatory variables 
High hazard 
(1) 
Pandemic risk 
(2) 
 
Unknown 
(3) 
Dread 
(4) 
Treated 0.956*** 1.034***  1.194*** 0.836*** 
 (0.253) (0.257)  (0.227) (0.246) 
Safe 0.521** 0.605**  0.186 0.647*** 
 (0.228) (0.259)  (0.353) (0.221) 
Inspected 0.523** 0.585***  0.566* 0.351 
 (0.205) (0.210)  (0.336) (0.222) 
Traced 0.110 0.154  0.606* 0.171 
 (0.187) (0.190)  (0.355) (0.191) 
Treated * food safety dimensions -1.133** -1.435***  Omitted No 
 (0.560) (0.535)    
Safe * food safety dimensions No -0.174  0.545 No 
  (0.491)  (0.514)  
Inspected * food safety dimensions -1.237* -1.579**  -0.717 0.345 
 (0.683) (0.663)  (0.468) (0.470) 
Traced * food safety dimensions No No  -1.122*** -0.305 
    (0.426) (0.479) 
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of the equation (4). The dependent variable is the index of willingness 884 
to pay (WTP) for information on food safety. The explanatory variables are modelled as dummy variables. Constant and 885 
control factors (food safety dimensions, journal rank, influential authors, journal area) included in all specifications. No 886 
data available for ‘safe * high’, ‘traced * high’, ‘traced * pandemic’, ‘treated * dread, ‘safe * unknown’. ‘treated * 887 
unknown’ omitted due to collinearity. Observations are 251. Standard errors are in parentheses. 888 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 889 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 890 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 891 
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Table 7. Effects of information on food safety associated with food-borne risk factors objectively least (1) and most (2) 893 
dangerous. 894 
 Extreme dimensions of objective food safety 
Explanatory variables 
Low hazard & idiosyncratic risk 
(1) 
High hazard & pandemic risk 
(2) 
Treated -0.257 0.956*** 
 (0.396) (0.253) 
Safe 0.258 0.521** 
 (0.238) (0.228) 
Inspected 0.310 0.523** 
 (0.248) (0.205) 
Traced 0.511* 0.110 
 (0.272) (0.187) 
Treated * food safety dimensions 1.856*** -1.133** 
 (0.463) (0.560) 
Safe * food safety dimensions No No 
   
Inspected * food safety dimensions -0.092 -1.237* 
 (0.418) (0.683) 
Traced * food safety dimensions -0.807** No 
 (0.351)  
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of the equation (4). The dependent variable is the index of willingness 895 
to pay (WTP) for information on food safety. The explanatory variables are modelled as dummy variables. Constant and 896 
control factors (food safety dimensions, journal rank, influential authors, journal area) included in all specifications. No 897 
data available for ‘safe * low * idiosyncratic’, ‘safe * high * pandemic’, ‘traced * high * pandemic’. Standard errors are 898 
in parentheses. 899 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 900 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 901 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 902 
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Table 8. Effects of information on food safety when objective risk equals subjective risk. 904 
 Extreme dimensions of objective and subjective food safety 
Explanatory variables High hazard & unknown Pandemic & unknown 
Treated 0.956*** 1.034*** 
 (0.253) (0.257) 
Safe 0.521** 0.605** 
 (0.228) (0.259) 
Inspected 0.523** 0.585*** 
 (0.205) (0.210) 
Traced 0.110 0.154 
 (0.187) (0.190) 
Treated * food safety dimensions -1.133** -1.435*** 
 (0.560) (0.535) 
Safe * food safety dimensions No -0.174 
  (0.491) 
Inspected * food safety dimensions -1.237* -1.579** 
 (0.683) (0.663) 
Traced * food safety dimensions No No 
   
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of the equation (4). The dependent variable is the index of willingness 905 
to pay (WTP) for information on food safety. The explanatory variables are modelled as dummy variables. Constant and 906 
control factors (food safety dimensions, journal rank, influential authors, journal area) included in all specifications. No 907 
data available for ‘safe * high * unknown’, ‘traced * high * unknown’, ‘traced * pandemic * unknown’. Standard errors 908 
are in parentheses. 909 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 910 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 911 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 912 
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Appendix 914 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for main explanatory variables. 915 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Labels 
Treated 1 if label is Treated (0 otherwise) 0.112 0.315 
Safe 1 if label is Safe (0 otherwise) 0.171 0.378 
Inspected 1 if label is Inspected (0 otherwise) 0.203 0.403 
Traced 1 if label is Traced (0 otherwise) 0.307 0.462 
Labels with high hazard 
Treated * high 1 if label is Treated and hazard is high (0 otherwise) 0.024 0.153 
Safe * high§ 1 if label is Safe and hazard is high (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * high 1 if label is Inspected and hazard is high (0 otherwise) 0.012 0.109 
Traced * high§ 1 if label is Traced and hazard is high (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with pandemic risk 
Treated * pandemic 1 if label is Treated and risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.024 0.153 
Safe * pandemic 1 if label is Safe and risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.036 0.186 
Inspected * pandemic 1 if label is Inspected and risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.012 0.109 
Traced * pandemic§ 1 if label is Traced and risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with unknown food-borne risk factor 
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Treated * unknown 1 if label is Treated and food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.112 0.315 
Safe * unknown 1 if label is Safe and food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.036 0.186 
Inspected * unknown 1 if label is Inspected and food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.080 0.271 
Traced * unknown 1 if label is Traced and food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.147 0.355 
Labels with dread food-borne risk factor 
Treated * dread§ 1 if label is Treated and phenomena is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Safe * dread§ 1 if label is Safe and phenomena is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * dread 1 if label is Inspected and phenomena is dread (0 otherwise) 0.072 0.259 
Traced * dread 1 if label is Traced and phenomena is dread (0 otherwise) 0.064 0.245 
Labels with high hazard and pandemic risk 
Treated * high * pandemic 1 if label is Treated, hazard is high, risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.024 0.153 
Safe * high * pandemic§ 1 if label is Safe, hazard is high, risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * high * pandemic 1 if label is Inspected, hazard is high, risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.012 0.109 
Traced * high * pandemic§ 1 if label is Traced, hazard is high, risk is pandemic (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with unknown and dread food-borne risk factor 
Treated * unknown * dread§ 1 if label is Treated and food-borne risk factor is unknown, dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Safe * unknown * dread§ 1 if label is Safe and food-borne risk factor is unknown, dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * unknown* dread 1 if label is Inspected and food-borne risk factor is unknown, dread (0 otherwise) 0.068 0.252 
Traced * unknown * dread 1 if label is Traced and food-borne risk factor is unknown, dread (0 otherwise) 0.028 0.165 
Labels with low hazard and idiosyncratic risk 
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Treated * low * idiosyncratic 1 if label is Treated, hazard is low, risk is idiosyncratic (0 otherwise) 0.088 0.283 
Safe * low * idiosyncratic§ 1 if label is Safe, hazard is low, risk is idiosyncratic (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * low * idiosyncratic 1 if label is Inspected, hazard is low, risk is idiosyncratic (0 otherwise) 0.068 0.252 
Traced * low * idiosyncratic 1 if label is Traced, hazard is low, risk is idiosyncratic (0 otherwise) 0.147 0.355 
Labels with known and not dread food-borne risk factor§ 
Treated * known * not dread 1 if label is Treated and food-borne risk factor is known and not dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Safe * known * not dread 1 if label is Safe and food-borne risk factor is known and not dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * known * not dread 1 if label is Inspected and food-borne risk factor is known and not dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Traced * known * not dread 1 if label is Traced and food-borne risk factor is known and not dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with high hazard and unknown food-borne risk factor 
Treated * high * unknown 1 if label is Treated, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.024 0.153 
Safe * high * unknown§ 1 if label is Safe, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * high * unknown 1 if label is Inspected, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.012 0.109 
Traced * high * unknown§ 1 if label is Traced, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with pandemic risk and unknown food-borne risk factor 
Treated * pandemic * unknown 1 if label is Treated, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.024 0.153 
Safe * pandemic * unknown 1 if label is Safe, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.036 0.186 
Inspected * pandemic * unknown 1 if label is Inspected, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.012 0.109 
Traced * pandemic * unknown 1 if label is Traced, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is unknown (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with high hazard and dread food-borne risk factor§ 
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Treated * high * dread 1 if label is Treated, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Safe * high * dread 1 if label is Safe, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * high * dread 1 if label is Inspected, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Traced * high * dread 1 if label is Traced, hazard is high, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Labels with pandemic risk and dread food-borne risk factor§ 
Treated * pandemic * dread 1 if label is Treated, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Safe * pandemic * dread 1 if label is Safe, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Inspected * pandemic * dread 1 if label is Inspected, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
Traced * pandemic * dread 1 if label is Traced, risk is pandemic, food-borne risk factor is dread (0 otherwise) 0.000 0.000 
§ indicates explanatory variables with no observations. 916 
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